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ployer is not likely to find lighter work for the employee no
longer able to perform regular work if wages paid therefor are
considered earned and hence not credited against compensation
due the employee. Further, the uncertainty present as to whether
wages are actually earned or unearned may have a detrimental
effect on an employee's claim. If the employee assumes his
wages fall in the unearned classification but in actuality they
do not, prescription will bar his claim. However, if the employee
chooses to sue to establish his claim and avoid the risk of having
it prescribe, he runs the risk of losing his job.
Thus it seems that, from a standpoint of policy, the distinc-
tion between earned and unearned wages in the problem areas
of the retained employee should be abolished. This would defi-
nitely encourage rehabilitation, since the employer could be sure
that he would not have to pay both wages and compensation.
At the same time the employee could be sure that his claim is
not prescribing since all the wages paid would interrupt pre-
scription. As a result he would not be forced into court. It
seems that rehabilitation should be a primary consideration of
the courts; and since the elimination of the distinction between
earned and unearned wages would encourage rehabilitation,
there appears to be good reason for such elimination.
Hillary Crain
Strict Liability For Uses of Property Under the
Louisiana Civil Code
Under the classic doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher' the com-
mon law imposes liability on certain activities without a showing
1. Fletcher v. Rylands, 3 H. & C. 774, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (1865), reversed
in L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866), affirmed in L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868). In deciding the
case, the court in the Exchequer Chamber said: "We think that the true rule of
law is that the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects
and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his
peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which
is the natural consequence of its escape." Fletcher v. Rylands, L.R. 1 Ex. 265,
279-80 (1866). In the House of Lords, it was stated that the principle applied
only to a non-natural use of the defendant's land. Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3
H.L. 330, 338 (1868). Since the Rylands decision, various terms for the rule
have evolved, e.g., strict liability for abnormal things and activities (PROSSER,
ToUTs § 59 (2d ed. 1.955)), liability for ultrahazardous activities (RESTATEMENT,
ToRTs § 519 (1938)). Dean Prosser states that today a doctrine based on the
Rylands decision obtains in England and some twenty American jurisdictions.
PROSSER, op. cit. 8upra, at 329, 333.
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of negligence or intent. The application of the doctrine is de-
pendent upon two factors. 2 First, the activity must be unduly
dangerous, i.e., one that is likely to cause serious harm even with
the utmost care. Second, the activity must be one that is abnor-
mal to its surroundings. The fact that there must be a determi-
nation of whether the activity meets these elastic requirements
allows a court to weigh the relative advantages and disadvan-
tages to society of imposing strict liability upon a particular ac-
tivity. The basis for the imposition of this doctrine of strict lia-
bility is the belief that certain activities have developed to the
extent that they, as opposed to the innocent victim, should bear
the risks involved in their operation.4
Several recent cases5 have presented to the Louisiana judi-
2. These two factors are stated in a variety of ways. Under the RVlands de-
cision there must be (1) a collection in dangerous quantities of substances likely
to escape and do mischief, and (2) a non-natural use. Dean Prosser states that
the activity must: (1) involve a high degree of risk of harm to others; and (2)
be abnormal in the community and inappropriate to its surroundings. PROSSER,
TORTS 329 (2d ed. 1955). The Restatement of Torts provides: "An activity is
ultrahazardous if it (a) necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to the person,
land or chattels of others which cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost
care, and (b) is not a matter of common usage." It can be seen that all of these
definitions incorporate the two ideas of undue danger and unusualness. RESTATE-
MENT, TORTS § 520 (1938).
3. 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 794 (1956).
4. Id. at 794-95; PROSSER, TORTS 332 (2d ed. 1955). This view appears to
have been accepted by the Louisiana Supreme Court in the case of Fontenot v.
Magnolia Petroleum Co., 227 La. 866, 877, 80 So.2d 845, 849 (1955), in which
the court stated: "There can be no legal justification for relieving it [the busi-
ness] of liability and thereby deny compensatory damages to one having no relation
to the conducting of such business and thus compel him to bear the unwarranted
loss."
5. Gotreaux v. Gary, 232 La. 373, 94 So.2d 293 (1957), discussed in The
Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1956-1957 Term-Torts and Work-
men's Compensation, 18 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW 63, 64 (1957), and noted in 32
TuL. L. REV. 146 (1957) (held strict liability imposed on crop dusting opera-
tions) ; Modica v. Employers Casualty Co., 231 La. 1065, 93 So.2d 659 (1957)
(held causal connection not established between damages to residence and opera-
tion of machine used to ram pipeline under highway); Fontenot v. Magnolia
Petroleum Co. 227 La. 866, 80 So.2d 845 (1955), discussed in The Work of the
Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1954-1955 Term-Torts and Workmen's Com-
pensation, 16 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 228, 267 (1956), and noted in 30 TUL. L.
REV. 156 (1955) (held company carrying on blasting operations liable for damage
to nearby homes without a showing of negligence or fault) ; Town of Jackson v.
Mounger Motors, Inc., 98 So.2d 697 (La. App. 1957) (held use of property as a
used car lot not so inherently dangerous as to warrant imposition of strict liabil-
ity) ; Jones v. Morgan, 96 So.2d 109 (La. App. 1957) (held causal connection
established between damages to cotton crop and spraying of rice field with chemi-
cals) ; Pate v. Western Geophysical Co., 91 So.2d 431 (La. App. 1956) (held
causal connection established between damages to property and blasting opera-
tions) ; Beck v. Boh Brothers Construction Co., 72 So.2d 765 (La. App. 1954)
(held causal connection not established between damages to residence and opera-
tion of concrete mixer) ; Bruno v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 67 So.2d
920 (La. App. 1953) (held plaintiff could recover for damages to dwelling by
pile driving operations conducted in the regular and customary manner) ; Hauck
v. Brunet, 50 So.2d 495 (La. App. 1951), noted in 6 LOYOLA L. REV. 77 (1951),
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ciary this question of liability for damage caused by conduct
which is neither negligent nor intentional. In deciding these
cases, the Louisiana courts have rested their decision on Article
667 of the Louisiana Civil Code, which provides:
"Although a proprietor may do with his estate whatever
he pleases, still he can not make any work on it, which may
deprive his neighbor of the liberty of enjoying his own, or
which may be the cause of any damage to him."
The purpose of this Comment is to examine the language of
the article, the various judicial interpretations of it, and its use
as a solution to the problem dealt with at common law under the
doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher.
THE SERVITUDE VIEW OF ARTICLE 667
According to the Louisiana Civil Code, perfect ownership
gives the right to use, to enjoy, and to dispose of one's property
in the most unlimited mannerT Certain attributes of this per-
fect ownership may be limited by the establishment of servi-
tudes, which are charges laid upon one estate for the use and
convenience of another estate.8 The establishment of a servitude
is dependent upon the existence of separate estates9 belonging
to different owners. 10 Article 667 of the Civil Code is found in
the title "Of Predial Servitudes" in the chapter "Of Servitudes
Imposed by Law." It was included in the Louisiana Civil Code
of 18081" and, although it is found in neither the Code Napoleon
nor the present French Civil Code, it appears to have been taken
verbatim from the writings of Domat. 2 A literal reading of the
article and its location in the Code suggest that it establishes a
26 TUL. L. REV. 524 (1952) (held plaintiff could recover for damage to dwelling
caused by pile driving operations even though piles were driven in the usual and
customary manner and even though defendant had no reason whatever to antici-
pate or foresee any possible damage).
6. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 667 (1870).
7. Id. art. 491.
8. Id. art. 647.
9. Id. art. 648.
10. Id. art. 640.
11. "Quoiqu'un propritaire puisse faire dans son fonds, tout ce que bon lui
semble, it ne peut cependant y faire d'ouvrage qui Ote 4 son voisin, ta libertM de
jouir du sien, ou qui cause quelque dommage." LA. CIVIL CODE 1808, p. 130,
Art. 15.
"Although a proprietor may do with his estate whatever he pleases, still lie can-
not make On it any work .which may deprive his neighbor of the liberty of enjoying
his own, or which may be to him the cause of any damage." Ibid.
12. 1 DOMAT. THrE CIVIL LAW IN ITS NATURAL ORDER 441-42, Nos. 1046, 1047
(Cushing's ed. Strahan's transl. 1853).
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servitude imposed by law proscribing any utilization of proper-
ty which causes a harmful effect to the estate of a neighbor.
The effect of the article, however, is somewhat qualified by Ar-
ticle 668, which provides that neighboring landowners may be
required to sustain "some inconvenience."' 3 Nevertheless, it
would appear that a violation of this servitude occurs whenever
the utilization of property by one person causes more than "some
inconvenience" to the property of another. Since the basis of re-
covery would not be one in tort, but one that arises from the
violation of a servitude, the question of "negligence" should not
be taken into consideration.
If this view of Article 667 as establishing a servitude is ac-
cepted, it follows that the article should not serve as a basis of
liability in situations where basic servitude principles are inap-
plicable. Thus, the article should not be used to impose liability
on a person, such as an independent contiactor operating on the
estate, who does not own the estate. 14 Neither should liability be
imposed on one, such as a lessee, whose interest in the estate is
less than ownership. 15 Further, it would appear that the article
should not be used as a basis of recovery for injuries to the per-
son, since the article provides only for damages to an estate.
It can be seen that the type of liability provided for by a lit-
eral reading of Article 667 is related to the common law doctrine
of strict liability derived from Rylands v. Fletcher. This is true
at least in the sense that under both views only damage and
causation need be shown in order for recovery to be allowed.
However, the servitude view differs from the Rylands doctrine
in that the latter is restricted in its application to ultrahazardous
activities. Further, because the Rylands doctrine is not exclu-
sively a landowner doctrine, it is applicable to situations which
13. LA. CrvIL CODE art. 668 (1870) : "Although one be not at liberty to make
any work by which his neighbor's buildings may be damaged, yet every one has
the liberty of doing on his own ground whatsoever he pleases, although it should
occasion some inconvenience to his neighbor.
"Thus he who is not subject to any servitude originating from a particular
agreement in that respect, may raise his house as high as he pleases, although
by such elevation he should darken the lights of his neighbor's house, because this
act occasions only an inconvenience, but not a real damage."
14. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 648, 649 (1870), requiring that there must be two
separate estates belonging to two different persons would seem to preclude this.
15. The word "proprietor" in Article 667 is a translation from the French
version of the Civil Code of 1808 of the word "propridtaire," denoting a land-
owner. Throughout the articles on servitudes, the word "propridtaire" is rendered
as either "owner" (e.g., Articles 647, 659, 670, and 671) or "proprietor" (e.g.,
Articles 660, 662, 666, 667 and 672). It would thus seem that the article im-
poses a duty only on the owner of the estate and not on a lessee.
1960]
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the servitude view of Article 667 would not cover.
The servitude view of Article 667 is based on an examination
of the language of the article and its location in the Civil Code.
It would seem that this is the view apparently intended by the
redactors of the Civil Code of 1808. In examining the jurispru-
dence it is interesting to compare this view of the article with
the manner in which the article has actually been employed.
ARTICLE 667 AND THE JURISPRUDENCE
Prior to 1947 little attention was paid by the Louisiana courts
to Article 667 in deciding controversies arising between neigh-
boring landowners over various uses of land. 16 Since 1947, how-
ever, it would appear that the appellate courts of Louisiana have
utilized Article 667 in order to dispose of any requirement of
fault or negligence in certain actions for damage caused by
the operation of various activities. Apparently three positions
have been set forth: (1) that Article 667 imposes liability on
activities classified as nuisances even though these activities
are conducted with reasonable care; (2) that Article 667 imposes
liability on all activities which cause any damage to neighboring
property, even in the absence of negligence; (3) that Article 667
imposes liability without a showing of negligence, on activities
which by their nature cause risk or peril to others.
That Article 667 could be used to impose liability on properly
operated enterprises was first enunciated in the case of Devoke
v. Yazoo & M.V. R.R.,17 decided in 1947. In this case the Su-
16. In most of the early cases involving disputes between neighboring land-
owners over various uses of land, much reliance was placed by the courts on
the concept of nuisance. Cases and materials on nuisance from the common law
were used a great deal. In a recent court of appeal case, it has been stated:
"Cases involving the abatement of nuisances are many and varied. The founda-
tion of the rights of such actions is a matter of codal provision and is set forth
in Articles 667, 668, 669 of our Civil Code. These articles have been oft inter-
preted and applied in a long line of familiar decisions." Hobson v. Walker, 41
So.2d 789, 794 (La. App. 1949).
Two cases of interest in which a use of Article 667 to impose strict liability
was rejected are Watkins v. Gulf Refining Co., 206 La. 942, 20 So.2d 273 (1944)
(in action to recover for damages from "blowing out" of a well on the theory
that Article 667 imposes absolute liability, held, recovery could be allowed under
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and that the question of strict liability need not
be reached) and McIlhenny v. Roxana Petroleum Corp., 122 So. 165 (La. App.
1929) (in action to recover for damages from explosion of dynamite nine miles
from plaintiff's home, held, Article 667 inapplicable).
17. 211 La. 729, 30 So.2d 816 (1947). On the same day, the Supreme Court
held that a petition seeking to recover damages for injury to property allegedly
occasioned by soot and oily substance dispersed from defendant's carbon black
plant and for abatement of alleged nuisance stated a cause of action, although
it did not contain any allegation of negligence. O'Neal v. Southern Carbon Co.,
[Vol. XX
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preme Court found that the operation of a railroad terminal was
a nuisance and held that liability for nuisance did not depend on
negligence. This holding was a modification of the jurispru-
dence; for in prior decisions if the thing complained of was prop-
erly installed, properly operated, and of modern vintage, i8 the
court would hold that these were unavoidable inconveniences
which must be accepted for the sake of the public good.' 9 In
reaching its decision in the Devoke case the court referred to
various material from the common law dealing with "nui-
sance." 2 It should be noted that at common law private nuisance
is an unreasonable interference with the interest in the use and
enjoyment of land. The determination that the interference is
unreasonable is essentially a balancing process by which the
gravity of the harm to the plaintiff is weighed against the util-
ity of the defendant's conduct. 21 Thus it would appear that the
211 La. 1075, 31 So.2d 216 (1947) (this case later came up on the merits, 216
La. 96, 43 So.2d 230 (1949) ; the court refused to allow damages on the ground
that casual connection was not established between injuries to residence and oper-
ation of the carbon plant). For a court of appeal case applying the Devoke
rule see Codding v. Braswell Supply, Inc., 54 So.2d 852 (La. App. 1951) (plain-
tiff could recover for damage to aluminum skins of trailers caused by cement
dust emanating from cement loading plant, even though negligence was not alleged
or proved).
18. Irby v. Panama Ice Co., 184 La. 1082, 1092, 168 So. 306, 310 (1936)
("living in such a neighborhood, plaintiffs cannot be heard to complain that an
industrial plant is operated on adjoining property, if it is operated in a proper
manner. Defendant's plant is properly operated and the noise and vibrations it
produces are only those which are unavoidable, and such as may be reasonably
expected to emanate from a plant of that character") ; DiCarlo v. Laundry &
Dry Cleaning Service, 178 La. 676, 152 So. 327 (1933) (one witness testified
that the machines are unbalanced, and defendants' witness testified that
good machines do not vibrate) : Germann v. 557 Tire Co., 167 La. 578, 120 So.
13 (1929) (evidence showed that this machine was either set up improperly
or else improperly operated); Orton v. Virginia Carolina Chemical Co., 142 La.
790, 793, 77 So. 632, 633 (1918) ("a careful reading of the testimony convinces
us that the defendant's plant was well constructed, but that it did not use certain
appliances that it might have used") ; Hill v. Chicago, St. Louis & New Orleans
R.R., 38 La. Ann. 599, 606 (1866) ("the best authorities agree that mere con-
sequential injuries, not occasioned by fault or neglect, but incident to the prudent
exercise of the right conferred, are not included").
19. LeBlanc v. Orleans Ice Mfg. Co., 121 La. 249, 250-51, 46 So. 226, 227
(1908) ("the owner of such a plant must take all proper precautions to prevent
noise, smoke, etc., from becoming a nuisance to the neighbors . . . This being
done, unavoidable noise, smoke, etc., must be considered as an inconvenience to
which the neighbors must submit for the public good"). Cf. Germann v. 577
Tire Co., 167 La. 578, 120 So. 13 (1929) and Eagen v. Tri-State Oil Co., 183
So. 124 (La. App. 1938), in which it was stated that it is only unavoidable
disturbances to which neighbors must submit for the public good and in which
plaintiffs were allowed to recover because of finding that damage was not un-
avoidable.
20. 211 La. 729, 740, 30 So.2d 816, 820 (1947). The court relied strongly
on the American Jurisprudence section on nuisance. It also cited WINFIELD, LAW
OF TORT (2d ed. 1943) ; HARPER, TORTS (1933) ; Ruling Case Law, Words and
Phrases (Nuisance) ; and various cases from common law jurisdictions.
21. PRosssR, TORTS § 72 (2d ed. 1955): "Private Nuisance. The law of
private nuisance is very largely a series of adjustments to limit the reciprocal
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court in the Devoke case did no more than recognize that in
some situations the balancing process involved in determining
the existence of a nuisance might result in liability being ima-
posed on properly operated businesses. However, in order to in-
corporate this common law rule into Louisiana law, the court
cited Article 667. This article was used as the basis for a state-
ment that the action was clearly not one in tort, but sprang from
an obligation imposed upon property owners by the operation of
law.22 The use of the article in this manner and the result of the
case suggest a possible consistency with the servitude view of
the article. The proprietor of one estate was held liable for dam-
age caused to a neighboring estate by the use of his property.
Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that the court did not bind
itself to a literal interpretation of Article 667. The requirement
that the activity must first be classified as a nuisance in order
for liability to attach allowed the court to balance the competing
interests.
A second interpretation of Article 667 is found in two deci-
sions of the Orleans Court of Appeal.2 3 In these cases the court
apparently read Article 667 literally, holding that where the
property of the plaintiff was injured by pile driving operations
on adjoining premises, the plaintiff could recover against the
owner of the adjoining premises under Article 667 without a
rights and privileges of both, in every case the court must make a comparative
evaluation if the conflicting interests according to objective legal standards, and
the gravity of the harm to the plaintiff must be weighed against the utility of
the defendant's conduct."
HARPE & JAMES, TORTS 71, § 1.24 (1956) : "The element of fault in private
nuisance. What constitutes a reasonable user of property on the one hand, or
an unreasonable harm to others on the other, must be determined by reference
to all the conditions of the parties, the circumstances of the situation, and the
balancing of advantages and disadvantages incident to the defendant's conduct
for all concerned. The social desirability and utility of the defendant's conduct
together with the possibility and practicability of avoiding the damage to the
plaintiff are important considerations."
22. 211 La. 729, 743, 30 So.2d 816, 821 (1947). This statement by the court
is rather enigmatic in that nuisance is considered a tort at common law and in
that the court in this opinion relied on common law "tort" material. It would
seem that the court meant that this was not an action in that type of tort suit
where negligent conduct or intentional wrongdoing is a requisite.
23. Bruno v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 67 So.2d 920 (La. App.
1953) (plaintiff could recover against owner of adjacent property for damage
to dwelling caused by pile driving operations conducted in the regular and cus-
tomary manner and in no way negligently); Hauck v. Brunet, 50 So.2d 495
(La. App. 1951) ; noted in 6 LOYOLA L. REV. 77 (1951) and 26 TUL. L. REV.
524 (1952) (plaintiff could recover against owner of adjacent property for
damage to dwelling caused by pile driving operations without adducing proof
that the performance of the work had been done unlawfully, negligently, or in-
tentionally).
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showing of negligence.24 This interpretation is similar to the
servitude view of the article and, if followed, would lead to an
imposition of liability broader than that involved in a nuisance
case25 or in a case based on the Rytands doctrine.
However, any extension of this literal view devised by the
Orleans Court of Appeal would appear to be negatived by a third
line of cases interpreting Article 667. In these cases the courts
have used Article 667 as a basis for a rule of liability resembling
that of Rylands v. Fletcher. This is first noticeable in the case
of Fontenot v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 26 decided in 1955, which
involved damages from the operation of geophysical explora-
tions with dynamite. In this case the court allowed recovery
without a showing of negligence, although the plaintiffs were
suing the engineering company which conducted the tests and
not the owner of the neighboring property. The court held that
the doctrine of absolute liability is applicable to activities which
cause risk or peril to others, even though the defendant is with-
out fault and conducts his business according to modern and
approved methods and with reasonable care. Although the court
stated that the action was not one in tort but one that sprang
from an obligation imposed by law on property owners, 27 it
24. This line of cases appears to have begun with Loesch v. R. P. Farnsworth
& Co., 12 So.2d 222 (La. Orl. App. 1943). In that case the plaintiff was suing
the contractor and not the owner of the property for damages caused by pile
driving. There was no negligence. The court did not reach the question of the
type of liability imposed by Article 667; for they held that the article was not
applicable to independent contractors operating on the property. In the Hauck
case (1951), the court was squarely presented with the question, for there the
plaintiff sued the owner of the property. In holding the owner liable, the court
stated: "It seems paradoxical to say that the exercise of a legal right by one
can amount to a legal wrong, but the . . . article emphatically places the onus
on a proprietor of making upon his property no work which may be the cause of
damage to his neighbor's property." (50 So.2d 495, 497). In the Bruno case
(1953), applying the rules of the former cases, the court held the owner liable,
but absolved the contractor and subcontractor of liability under Article 667.
25. Under the concept of nuisance only those activities which, in the court's
opinion, cause "unreasonable interference" are subjected to liability. If Article
667 is read so as to impose liability on activities which cause "any damage" it
can be seen that liability would be imposed in more instances than under the
nuisance concept. On the other hand, if Article 668, providing that the neigh-
bor may be required to sustain "some inconvenience," is interpreted as including
some physical damage, it can be seen that this interpretation would result in a
type of liability very similar to that of nuisance.
26. 227 La. 866, 80 So.2d 845 (1955), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1954-1955 Term, 16 LoUISIANA LAW REviEw 228, 267
(1956), noted in 30 TUL. L. REV. 156 (1955). For a similar court of appeal
case see Pate v. Western Geophysical Co., 91 So.2d 431 (La. App. 1956) (held
causal connection established between damage to property and blasting operations).
27. The court's use of this statement here is especially puzzling in view of
the fact that the defendant in the case had no proprietary interest in the land
whatsoever.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
should be noted that the holding and the language used are clear-
ly not consistent with a servitude view of Article 667. First,
the court's statement that strict liability is applicable to activ-
ities which cause "risk or peril" can be interpreted as a qualifi-
cation by the court of the effect of the article .2  This interpre-
tation would be a departure from the words of the article, which
apparently proscribes all works which cause damage or depriva-
tion of enjoyment. Secondly, it is obvious that since a servitude
requires the existence of two separately owned estates, there
can be no violation of a servitude when, as here, the defendant
had no proprietary interest whatsoever. On the contrary, it can
be seen that the holding of the court bears a greater resemblance
to the Rylands doctrine, with its qualification of "ultrahazard-
ous.,"
In 1957, in the case of Gotreaux v. Gary, 29 the Louisiana Su-
preme Court held a crop duster and the owner of the property
strictly liable for damage done by the crop dusting to a neigh-
bor's crop. In disposing of this case the court relied on Article
667 and the Fontenot case. It is interesting to note that the
plaintiffs contended that spraying was a nuisance and that, un-
der the Devoke rule, liability for a nuisance did not depend on
negligence. The court, however, stated that the legal problem
presented was not that of private nuisance, but resolved itself
to the determination of whether the doctrine of strict liability
was applicable. Thus it would appear that in these two cases
the Supreme Court evolved a rule very similar to the Rylands
doctrine and that it has not recognized any view of Article 667
as establishing a servitude. Further, it would appear that the
court has recognized a type of liability distinct from that of the
Devoke case.30
28. For such an interpretation, see Town of Jackson v. Mounger Motors,
98 So.2d 697, 699 (1957).
29. 232 La. 373, 94 So.2d 293 (1957), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1956-1957 Term-Torts and Workmen's Compensation,
18 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 63 (1957), noted in 32 TUL. L. REV. 146 (1957).
For a similar court of appeal case, see Jones v. Morgan, 96 So.2d 109 (La. App.
1957) (causal connection established between damages to cotton crop and spray-
ing of rice field with chemicals).
30. Under the Rylands rule, an activity which is classified as "ultrahazardous"
is liable for any damage it may occasion without proof of negligence. Liability
under the concept of nuisance is different in that any activity which causes
"unreasonable interference" with adjoining property is a nuisance and the other
party may recover damages. Thus the fact situation in the Devoke case, train
terminal emitting smoke, is readily classified as an "unreasonable interference,"
although it would seem difficult to classify it as an ultrahazardous activity" or,
in the words of the court in Fontenot, as an activity causing risk or peril. The
statement in the text that the court in these two cases has apparently recognized
[Vol. XX
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A recent court of appeal case, which carried the Rylands the-
ory even further is Town of Jackson v. Mounger Motors, Inc., 31
in which the town's fire house was damaged when a truck on
an adjacent used car lot was backed into it by a driver who took
the truck without permission after business hours. The court
stated that Article 667, as interpreted in the Fontenot case, was
the Rylcnds principle and that this doctrine applies only when
an activity involves a high degree of risk of harm to others and
when it is inappropriate to the place where it is maintained.
Applying these rules to the fact situation presented, the court
reached the conclusion that the evidence did not reflect such a
use of property so inherently dangerous as to justify the applica-
tion of strict liability.
CONCLUSION
Since 1947 the Louisiana courts have enunciated three in-
terpretations of Article 667. The view developed by the Orleans
Court of Appeal that the article imposes a duty on proprietors
not to damage their neighbor's property is most consistent with
the servitude view. However, this was apparently an independ-
ent development by the Orleans Court and would seem to be
implicitly overruled by later Supreme Court cases. In the Devoke
case the Supreme Court used Article 667 as the basis for its
holding that liability for nuisance does not depend on negligence.
This view still has not been overruled by the Supreme Court,
although its effect would seem to be limited by the decision in
the Gotreaux case.3 2
The most important development, however, has been the in-
troduction of a doctrine into Louisiana very similar to the com-
mon law doctrine of strict liability for ultrahazardous activities.
Although the Louisiana Supreme Court has not yet stated out-
a type of liability distinct from that of Devoke is based on two factors. First,
the court rejected the contention of the plaintiff in the Gotreau case that the
legal problem presented was one of private nuisance. Second, the court in the
Fontenot case stated that absolute liability is imposed on activities causing "risk
or peril," which appears to be more closely connected with the notion of "ultra-
hazardous" than with "unreasonable interference." However, it should be pointed
out that in both the Fontenot and Gotreaux cases the court referred with approval
to the Devoke case. In addition, in the Gotreaum case the court, citing the Devoke
case, stated: "Although the use of the spraying operation was lawful, it was
carried out in such a manner as to unreasonably inconvenience plaintiff and
deprive him of the liberty of enjoying his farm." This language would seem to
indicate that the court was still regarding this as a nuisance type interference.
31. 98 So.2d 697 (La. App. 1957).
32 See note 28 aupra.
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right that Article 667 is to be equated with the common law doc-
trine, the language and results of the opinions suggest that this
is the trend.
Since the article apparently establishes a servitude, the
court's use of it as the basis for a doctrine of strict liability for
ultrahazardous activities raises the question of the merits of the
court's view and the servitude view. From a vantage point of
the general problems of recovery for non-intentional, non-negli-
gent damage, a comparison of the two views would indicate that
the Rylands rule handles the problem better than the servitude
rule. In the first place, the Rylands rule allows the court great-
er flexibility in determining which activities are to be subjected
to liability without a showing of negligence. The requirements
of "undue danger" and "abnormal to the surroundings" furnish
the court a rule with which a differentiation can be made be-
tween activities of little use to society and those of great public
benefit. The servitude view, on the other hand, by apparently
imposing liability in all cases where the use of one estate causes
any damage to another estate, establishes a standard which is
very broad and inflexible, affording the court little balancing
power. In the second place, the Rylands rule enables a court to
reach situations which a servitude view would not. As Rylands
is not exclusively a landowner doctrine nor limited to affording
redress for damages to property, it would apply to persons with
no proprietary interest in land, and could be used as a basis
for allowing recovery for personal injuries. On the other hand,
the servitude view, by not imposing liability on a lessee or an
independent contractor and by not allowing recovery for per-
sonal injuries, would appear to be placilg its stress on a rela-
tively narrow aspect of the general problem. At best, the use of
a servitude view would require that other theories be used to
cover these situations.
Any use of Article 667, however, as a basis for a version of
the Rylands doctrine is embarrassed by the fact that the arti-
cle says nothing about peril-making enterprises or ultrahazard-
ous activities. Further, since Article 667 apparently applies only
to proprietors, using the article to impose liability on non-pro-
prietors results in an anomalous situation. It is submitted that
if the court is desirous of using the Rylands doctrine, this could
be accomplished through Article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil
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Code, 3 providing that every act whatever of man that causes
damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to re-
pair it. The court could recognize that the word fault need not be
limited in its meaning to negligence or wrongful intent, and
hold that "fault" is present whenever one exposes another to
injury by engaging in an ultrahazardous activity and in so doing
causes injury. The acceptance of such a view would have the
advantage of incorporating a form of strict liability into our
law which would bring about the desired result in a manner not
inconsistent with the Code.
If a form of strict liability were read into Article 2315, there
would still remain the question of what to do with Article 667.
If it is felt that the language of the article is in fact too broad,
it is submitted that the application of the article might be limited
to the adjudication of disputes between adjoining landowners
involving typical "nuisance" situations.3 4 It should be noted that
such an interpretation 5 would not result in a literal application
of the article, but would have the effect of introducing the con-
cept of "unreasonableness" into the article. This interpretation
would give the article meaning and at the same time serve to
limit its broad and unqualified language.
George C. Herget, Jr.
Attorney's Fees As An Element of Damages:
The General Rule and Its Exceptions
In general the jurisprudence of Louisiana has not favored
the allowance of attorney's fees as part of the damages to be
33. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2315 (1870).
34. It would seem that the concepts of nuisance and of Article 667, as written,
are quite similar in that they both purport to be rules for regulating disputes
between adjoining proprietors over various uses of land. The chief distinction
would appear to be in the nature of the interference. For an activity to be
classified as a nuisance, the interference must be "unreasonable." On the other
hand, any interference which is more than "some inconvenience" (Article 668)
would appear to be a violation of Article 667 as written.
35. This interpretation of the article bears a close resemblance to the decision
of the Supreme Court in Devoke v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., discussed above. See
note 17, supra. Further, as pointed out above (see note 28 supra) the later
Supreme Court cases which seem to be moving toward a rule resembling Rylands,
do contain language suggesting that the type of liability involved is related to
that of nuisance.
1960]
